## GMT Research Accounting Screen

Short Name
GICS Ind Name
GICS Industry
Cntry of Dom
Most Recent Balance Sheet Period
Ticker
Latest Period
Current Fiscal Year
Well known auditor
Numbe of auditors in past 5yrs:
Country of incorporation:
Country of financials:

China Dongxiang
Textiles, Apparel \& Luxury Goods
252,030

| CN |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2017 Y |

2017 Y
3818 HK

| Y |
| :--- |
| 2017 |

2017
1
Country of incorporation (Cayman Islands) is different from domicile (China) Currency of financials (Yuan Renminbi) is same as country of risk (China).

Description:
China Dongxiang Group Co Ltd retails sportswear apparel products.

Relevant GMT Research Reports (please go to our website and login):

Short-Seller's Report (for Asian companies only)

Summary of accounting risk for Y/FY17

- Profit manipulation
- Financial position
- General accounting
- Shenanigans
= Accounting risk:


## Normal

Normal
Problematic accounting with 30 red flags
Evidence: Fake Cash Flow.
High

Latest financials complete
Beneish M-Score of -2.54 in Y/FY17 suggests no profit manipulation.
A C-Score of $3 / 6$ is average but watch out for: Deteriorating Accruals Margin. Rising inventory. Falling depreciation.
An F-Score of 4/9 suggests financials are slightly deteriorating owing to: ROA. OPCF less than Profit. Increase in Shares. Gross Margin. Asset Turnover.
An Altman Z-Score of 15.91 is in the Safe Zone: Financially sound.

## No evidence of acquisition accounting

No evidence of window dressing
Scores $3 / 4$ in Y/FY17. Medium Fraud Alert: $23 \%$ of frauds score 3 points and $10 \%$ of all companies. Further investigation needed. Triggered Fake Cash Flow in last 5yrs?: FY17 FY16 FY15 FY14 Net flows over 5yrs at $-17 \%$ of Sales are normal.
No material unreconcilable changes in debt in the last 5 years.
Triggers 30 red flags in the last financial period which is high.
Cash \& STI of CNY1.3bn is extremely high at $123 \%$ of sales, in the $99 \%$ ile relative to peers, which is a trait of fake cash flow frauds.
Restricted Cash of CNYO.4bn is within normal range.
Receivables of CNYO.2bn are equal to $18 \%$ of Sales which is in within normal range
Delinquency at $0 \%$ of total receivables are within normal range.
Large Payables of CNYO.5bn equal to $33 \%$ of Sales are in the $99 \%$ ile relative to peers, have grown by 4ppts relative to Sales over the past year which can be a sign of hidden debt and manufactured cash flow. Large Payables of CNYO.5bn equal to $33 \%$ of Sales are in the $99 \%$ ile relative to peers, have grown by 4ppts relative to Sales over the past year which
Inventories of CNYO.3bn have been extended by 7pts relative to Sales over the past year which can be a sign of channel stuffing.
A high level of gross working capital at $305 \%$ of sales suggests the company might have inflated profits and/or cash flow in the past.
Prepaid Expenses of CNY2bn are large relative to sales ( $146.2 \%$ ) and inventory ( $615.9 \%$ ), raising the risk of illegal cash extraction fraud.
Capitalised expenses relative to pre-tax profits ( $0.5 \%$ ) are within normal range.
nvestments in Associates of CNYO.1bn are equal to $1 \%$ of equity and $2 \%$ of OP, within normal range.
Auditing expenses of 33 bp of sales are unusually high in the $98 \%$ ile relative to peers, suggesting a problematic set of financials.
Large Deferred Tax Assets/Sales of $10 \%$ in the $99 \%$ ile relative to peers, have increased by 5.1 ppts relative to sales over the past year which can be a sign of losses at subsidiaries or of Acquisition Accounting. Large Deferred Tax Liabilities/Sales of $117 \%$ in the $98 \%$ oile relative to peers, have increased by 60 ppts relative to sales over the past year which suggests that profits reported to shareholders are higher than those reported to tax authorities. Derivatives equal to $1 \%$ of equity within normal range.
Large Other ST Assets of CNY2.7bn include Unspecified of CNY2bn. Large LT Inv \& Rec of CNY5.7bn include Available For Sale Secs of CNY4.9bn.

## Within normal range.

EBIT Interest Cover of $37.9 x$ is within normal range.
Total Debt/Profit of 2.1 x and assets to equity of 1.1 x are within normal range.
Existence of related party balances which raises risk of round tripping.
Evidence of share price manipulation as 20 day MA Bid/Ask VWAP in excess of $60 \%$ for $4 \%$ of the time over last 6 m . New CEO. No or new CFO. Other comprehensive income is $60 \%$ of income which is Evidence of share price manipulation as high. Has a very large balance sheet with Assets at $815 \%$ of Sales in the $99 \%$ ile relative to peers.

## GMT Research Accounting Screen



## GMT Research Accounting Screen

| Ratios | Global/Sector/ | China Dongxiang Ratios |  |  | Ratio Change |  | Peer Group Comparison Ratios |  |  | Percentiles and Red Flags |  |  |  | Red Flag Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Country | Y/FY17 | Y/FY16 | Y/FY14 | -1yr Chg | -3yr Chg | 20th \%ile | 50th \%ile | 80th \%ile | No of Peers | Y/FY17 | -1yr Chg | -3yr Chg |  |
| Cash Flow |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0-100\%) | (+/-50\%) | (+/-50\%) |  |
| CFO/Net Profit (x) | GICS Industry | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | -0.0 | -0.1 | 0.3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1,697 | 83\% | +5\% | +10\% | CFO/Net Profit ( $)_{\text {l }}$ low. |
| Cash Interest Exp./CFO (\%) | GICS Industry | 11.5 | na | na | na | na | 0.2 | 4.8 | 25.8 | 271 | 65\% | na | na |  |
| Capex/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 3.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | +2.8 | +2.7 | 1.4 | 3.2 | 7.2 | 371 | 47\% | +38\% | +36\% | Risen over 1yr. Risen over 3yrs. |
| Decrease Investments/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 346.9 | 494.8 | 248.3 | -148.0 | +98.6 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 4.8 | 141 | 99\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | Decrease Investments/sales (\%) high. |
| Other Investing Activities/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 0.9 | 74.7 | 104.5 | -73.8 | -103.6 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 4.4 | 292 | 45\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Debt Repay/ST Debt -1FY (\%) | Global | 61 | 0 | na | +61.2 | na | 20.0 | 88.4 | 210.9 | 10,373 | 40\% | +32\% |  | Risen over 1yr. |
| Free Cash Flow Margin (\%) | GICS Industry | 10.2 | 14.9 | 21.8 | -4.7 | -11.6 | -4.2 | 2.4 | 8.7 | 377 | 16\% | +29\% | +41\% | Fallen over 3yrs. |
| FCF--Divs/Sales (\%) | Global | -101.4 | -22.8 | 9.9 | -78.6 | -111.3 | -7.2 | 0.9 | 6.8 | 10,563 | 99\% | +49\% | +49\% | FCF-Divs/Sales (\%) low. Fallen over 1yr. Fallen over 3yrs. |
| No. of Mat. Capital Inc -5yrs | Global |  | $\bigcirc$ | - | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 9,451 | na | $\bigcirc$ | $\longrightarrow$ |  |
| Other Fin. Activities/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 5.7 | 17.1 | 0.1 | -11.4 | +5.5 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 329 | 93\% | $\sum$ | $\sum$ | Other Fin. Activities/Sales (\%) high. |
| Corporate Governance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0-100\%) | (+/-50\%) | (+/-50\%) |  |
| Auditing Exp//Sales (bp) | GICS Industry | 33.0 | \% | $\checkmark$ | $\stackrel{3}{3}$ | $\stackrel{\square}{\square}$ | 2.5 | 6.3 | 13.2 | 179 | 98\% | $\stackrel{3}{3}$ | $\stackrel{\square}{\square}$ | Auditing Exp/Sales (bp) high. |
| RPT Balances/Equity (\%) | Global | 0.4 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\stackrel{\square}{ }$ | - | 0.3 | 1.9 | 11.0 | 1,434 | 25\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | RPT Balances/Equity (\%) low. |
| Number of Aca\&Disp -5yrs | Global |  | $\bigcirc$ | $\square$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\square$ | 0.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 12,251 | 36\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Acq\&Disp Con./Sales Av. - 5yrs (\%) | Global | 0.8 | $\bigcirc$ | $\leqslant$ | $\rightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ | 0.2 | 1.4 | 6.9 | 12,251 | 41\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Executive Comp/Sales (bp) | GICS Industry | 37.3 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 7.4 | 22.6 | 73.1 | 84 | 64\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Executive Comp/PTP (bp) | GICS Industry | 54.3 | < | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\bigcirc$ | 67.6 | 188.6 | 669.0 | 84 | 16\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| CEO Tenure (yrs) | Global | . 6 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 1.4 | 4.5 | 10.8 | 5,466 | 9\% | $\bigcirc$ | 3 | CEO Tenure (yrs) low. |
| CFO Tenure (yrs) | Global | na | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\rightarrow$ | $\cdots$ | 1.1 | 3.3 | 8.3 | 716 | na | $\bigcirc$ | 3 |  |
| Av. Executive Tenure (yrs) | Global | 4.5 | $\cdots$ | $\rightarrow$ | $\rightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ | 4.1 | 7.4 | 11.9 | 3,291 | 23\% | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  |
| Av. Board Tenure (yrs) | Global | na | , | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 3.9 | 6.4 | 9.9 | 3,672 |  | $\bigcirc$ | $\geq$ |  |

Source GMT Research, Bloomber

Summary of financials in Y/FY17
Average Ratio Percentile Score ( 0 is good, 100 is bad

- Percentile vs Industry Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 75)
-Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Summary of change in financials over 1 year
Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 62)

- Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Summary of change in financials over 3 yrs Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 62)

- Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Result: Very poor score. High number of red flags. $\qquad$

## Explanation

| 61\% | In Y/FY17, China Dongxiang recorded an average percentile score ( 0 is good, 100 is |
| :--- | :--- |
| $95 \%$ | bad) of $61 \%$ across all 75 financial ratios listed below. This places it in a percentile |

35 of 95 relative to around 379 GICS industry peers globally, which is a very unusual
ercentile of 98 relativered a total of 30 red flags out of 55 placing it in a very unusual result.
ach of the 50 financial ratios listed below is percentile ranked relative to an appropriate peer group drawn from 16,000 companies globally between 2010 and 2015. In general, low percentile scores are good while high scores are poor. Red flags are mainly triggered when a company's ratio is above the Result: High number of red flags. Red flags are highlighted below in red.

## Explanation

17 Over the financial year prior to $\mathrm{Y} /$ FY17, China Dongxiang triggered a total of 17 red
Red flags are normally triggered by a score between +30 and +50 which suggests an aggressively
Red flags are normally triggered by a score between +30 and +50
deteriorating financial ratio. These are highlighted in red below. flags out of 62 placing it in a percentile of 92 relative
companies globally, which is a very unusual result. Result: High number of red flags. $\qquad$
$\qquad$ Explanation Over the 3 financial years prior to Y/FY17, China Dongxiang triggered a total of 22 Red flags are normally triggered by a score between +30 and +50 which suggests an aggressively red flags out of 62 placing it in a percentile of 99 relative to our sample of 16,000 deteriorating financial ratio. These are highlighted in red below. companies globally, which is a very unusual result.

## GMT Research Accounting Screen

Appendices
Appendix 1: Beneish M-Score

|  | Calculation | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Index Calculation |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Days Sales in Receivables Index | +(0.92**.99) | 0.97 | 0.98 | 0.81 | 0.86 | 0.99 | 0.99 |  |
| Gross Margin Index | $+\left(0.528^{* 1.02)}\right.$ | 1.01 | 0.93 | 0.97 | 0.98 | 1.02 | 1.02 |  |
| Asset Quality Index | +(0.404*1.18) | 2.05 | 1.15 | 0.93 | 1.10 | 1.18 | 1.18 |  |
| Sales Growth Index | +(0.892**.90) | 0.80 | 0.89 | 1.16 | 1.02 | 0.90 | 0.90 | Sales $/$ / saes $_{\text {t-1 }}$ |
| Depreciation Index | +(0.115*1.32) | 1.07 | 0.93 | 1.17 | 0.90 | 1.32 | 1.32 |  |
| SG\&A Index | -(0.172*1.34) | 1.03 | 0.8 | 1.17 | 0.78 | 1.34 | 1.34 |  |
| Total Accruals to Total Assets | +(4.679*0.01) | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | Profit from Continuing Ops ${ }_{\text {- }}$ - Cash Flows from Ops ${ }_{\text {t }}$ / / Total Asse |
| Leverage Index | -(0.327*1.16) | 1.42 | 0.42 | 0.90 | 0.76 | 1.16 | 1.16 |  |
| Beneish M-Score for Y/FY17 | -4.84 = | -2.43 | -2.38 | -2.57 | -2.44 | -2.54 | -2.54 | An M-Score of $>-2.22$ signals that the company is likely to be a manipulator |

Recemments on latest perios
12 m Trailing Gross Margin of $55.7 \%$ has deteriorated by 1.2 ppts Yo Other LT Assets/Total Assets of $56.7 \%$ has increased by 8.8 ppts Yo 12 m Trailing Sales have fallen $-10 \%$ Yo
12 m Trailing Depreciation/Sales of $17.6 \%$ has fallen by $5.7 \mathrm{7pts}$ Yoy
$12 \mathrm{~m} \mathrm{Traliing} \mathrm{SG} \mathrm{\& A/Sales} \mathrm{of} 46.6 \%$ have fallen by 15.8 ppts
LT Debt + Current Liabilities/Total Assets of $10 \%$ have fallen by 1.7 ppts YoY
Beneish M-Score of -2.54 in $\mathrm{Y} / \mathrm{FY} 17$ suggests no profit manipulation

|  | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Point Calculation | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Profit | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | A growing divergence between Profit and Operating Cash Flow (1 point) | 12 m Trailing Accruals Margin of $-46.3 \%$ has fallen from $-42.8 \%$ YoY |
| Receivables | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Receivable Days are increasing (1 point) | Receivables of 64 days have fallen by 1 days Yoy |
| Inventory | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Inventory Days are increasing (1 point) | Inventory of 24 days has risen by 7 days Yoy |
| Other current assets | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Other Current Assets to Sales are increasing (1 point) | Other Current Assets/Sales of 220.2\% have fallen by 20.5 sppts YoY |
| Depreciaton | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | Depreciation relative to PPE jobs usfa bs | Depreciation of $8.2 y$ ys has risen by 1 yrs YoY |
| Asset growth Montier's C -Score | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | High asset growth in excess of $10 \%$ (1 point) | Asset growth of -2\% is below 10\% |
| Montier's C-Score | 2 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 |  |  |

Montier's C-Score

| Asset growth <br> Montier's C-Score |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Appendix 3: Piotroski F-Score |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 |
| Net Income Score | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Operating Cash Flow Score | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Return on Assets Score | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Quality of Earnings Score | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Long-Term Debt to Assets Score | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Current Ratio Score | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Shares Outstanding Score | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Gross Margin Score | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Asset Turnover Score | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Piotroski F-Score | 4 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 4 |

Schasset growth in excess of $10 \%$ (1 point)
Appendix 3: Piotroski F-Score

```
Point Calculation
Positive Operating Cash Flow in the current year (1 point) Higher Return on Assets than previous year (1 point) Operating Cash Flow are greater than ROA (1 point) Lower ratio of Long Term Debt than previous year (1 point) Higher Current Ratio this year compared to the previous year (1 point) No new shares were issued in the last year (1 point) A higher Gross Margin compared to the previous year ( 1 point) A high Asset Turnover ratio compared to the previous year (1 poin)
```

12 m Trailing Accruals Margin of $-46.3 \%$ has fallen from $-42.8 \%$ Yoy Receivables of 64 days have fallen by 1 days Yoy
lier Current Assets/Sales of $220.2 \%$ have
Asset growth of $-2 \%$ is below $10 \%$
A C-Score of $3 / 6$ is average

Appendix 4: Altman Z-Score

|  | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | Fr17 | Y/Fr17 | Altman Z -Score for a company in emerging markets | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Solvency | 2.82 | 2.60 | 3.11 | 2.63 | 2.30 | 2.30 | Working Capital (Current Assets less Current Liabilities)/Tangible Assets | Ability to meet short term obligations |
| Cumulative profitability | 1.96 | 1.82 | 2.20 | 2.25 | 2.09 | 2.09 | Retained Earnings/Tangible Assets | Determines cumulative historic profitability |
| Profitability | 0.04 | 0.43 | 0.38 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 0.51 | EBIT/Tangible Assets | Measures earnings away from the effects of taxes and leverage |
| Market confidence | na | na | na | na | na | na | Market Capitalisation/Total Liabilities | Whether a firm's value able to cover liabilities |
| Efficiency | na | na | na | na | na | na | Sales/Tangible Assets | An asset turnover metric to measure efficiency |
| Leverage | 26.29 | 11.45 | 9.71 | 6.91 | 7.75 | 7.75 | Book Value of Equity/Total Liabilities | Leverage |
| Altman Z -Score for $\mathrm{Y} / \mathrm{FY} 17$ | 34.36 | 19.54 | 18.65 | 15.59 | 15.91 | 15.91 | Anything $<1.81$ for a manufacturer or $<1.11$ for other companies is problematic | Safe Zone: Financially sound |

Appendix 5: Acquisition Accounting
Material acquisition?
Rise in intangibe assets -1yr?
Material intangibbes on balance sheet?
Rise in deferred tax assets $-1 y r$ ?
Large deferred tax assets
Actisition

| Point Calculation | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 point | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 point | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 point | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
|  | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
|  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Y/FY17 Point Calculation An acquisition in excess of S\% of sales.
Either a rise in Intangible Assets over 1 year
Or Intangibles are >=50\%ile relative to peers Either a rise in Deferred Tax Asset over 1 yea Or a large Deferred Tax Asset in the 80\%ile relative to industry pee

## 12 m Trailing Return on Assets of 2,2

12 m Trailing CFO Margin of $13.2 \%$
12 m Trailing CFO Margin of has fallen to $2.2 \%$ from $2.5 \%$ Yoy
12 m Trailing CFO Margin of $13.2 \%$ is below Net Profit Margin of $18.1 \%$
LT Debt/Total Assets has fallen to $5 \%$ from $7 \%$ Yoy
Current Ratio has risen to 5.35 x from $4.24 \times$ Yoy
Increased number of shares by $2.5 \%$
12 m Trailing Gross Margin of $55.7 \%$ has deteriorated by 1.2 ppts Yo Asset turnover has fallen to $0.12 \times$ from $0.14 \times$ Yo
Asset turnover has fallen to 0 fore of $4 / 9$ suggests financials are slightly deteriorating

Ability to meet short term obligations
Determines cumulative historic profitability

Safe Zone: Financially sound

## na

No recent material acquisitions (>5\% sales)
intangible Assets/Sales of $16 \%$ are in the $86 \%$ ile DTAs have risen by $5.1 \%$ of sales to $10.2 \%$ of sales DTA/Sales of $10.2 \%$ is in the $99 \%$ ile relative to industry peer No evidence of acquisition accounting.

## GMT Research Accounting Screen



Appendix 11: Insiders (latest Bloomberg data)

| Insider Shares $\mathrm{O} / \mathrm{S}(\%)$ | 2.06 | Comment |
| :--- | :---: | :--- |
| Chg Insider HIlds $-6 \mathrm{~m}(\%)$ | 0.00 | Changes in insider holdings can be due to options, etc. as opposed to actively buying or selling |
| Number of Insider Shares Purchased $(\mathrm{m})$ | +0.0 | shares |
| Number of Insider Shares Sold ( m ) | +0.0 |  |
| Average Purchase Price of Insider Shares | 0.00 | Current share price is HKD1.4 |
| Average Sell Price of Insider Shares | 0.00 |  |
| Shares Outstanding m ) | 5,075 |  |
| Insider Shares Traded $-6 \mathrm{~m} /$ Total Shares $(\%)$ | 0.00 |  |

Appendix 12: Comprehensive Income (latest Bloomberg data)

|  | (CNYm) | Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Comprehensive Income | 1,289 |  |
| Less: |  |  |
| Net Income/Net Profit (Losses) Other comprehensive income comprised of: | 805 |  |
| Unrealized Gain (Loss) On Securities | 598 | Other comprehensive income is $60 \%$ of income which is unusually high. Able to fully reconcile |
| Foreign Currency Trans. Adj. | (114) | other comprehensive income. |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| Amount unable to reconcile: | (0) |  |

Assets paid with debt (such as operating leases) is a non-cash item. Capex should be restate
Proceeds raised from convertible bonds (CBs) are sometimes regarded as equity, not debt.
Large acquisitions can lead to difficulties in reconciling debt.

