## GMT Research Accounting Screen

Short Name
GICS Ind Name
GICS Industry
Cntry of Dom
Most Recent Balance Sheet Period
Ticker
Latest Period
Current Fiscal Year
Current Fiscal Year
Well known auditor:
Numbe of auditors in past 5yrs:
Country of incorporation:
Country of financials:

| Fila Korea Ltd | I \& Luxury Goods | Description: |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Textiles, Apparel \& Luxury Goods |  | Fila Korea Ltd. imports and wholesales a variety of textile and apparel products. The Company's products include men's, women's, and children's activewear, sportswear, undergarment, and footwear. |
| 252,030 |  |  |
| KR |  |  |
| 2017 Y |  |  |
| 081660 KS |  |  |
| Y |  |  |
| 2017 |  |  |
| Samil Pricew |  |  |
| 2 | Samil Pricew. Samil. |  |
| Country of inc | rporation (South Kor | is same as domicile (South Korea). |
| Currency of fin | ancials (Korean Won) | me as country of risk (South Korea). |

Profit Manipulation
Profit Manipulation: Beneish M-Score (See App 1)
Cooking the Books: Montier's C-Score (App 2)
Financial Position
Strength of Financial Position: Piotroski F-Score (App 3)
Risk of Default: Altman Z-Score (App 4)
Accounting Shenanigans
Window Dressing (App 6)
Fake Cash Fraud: Overly profitable (App 7) Global screen Cos Capital Rising (App 8 )
Debt Reconciliation (App 9)
Other Financial Items
Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 75)
Cash Balance
Restricted Cash
Receivables
Doubtful Debts
Payables
nventory
Profit Manipulation: Gross Working Capital
Cash Extraction Fraud: Prepaid Expenses
Capitalisation of Expenses
Affiliate Investments
Auditing Costs
Deferred Tax Assets
Deferred Tax Liabilities
Derivatives
Other Large Curious Assets and/or Liabilities Depn \& Amort
Interest Cove
Leverage
Related Party Fraud
Other Tests:
atest financials complete Beneish M-Score of 1.55 in Y/FY17 sugests likely profit manipulion, trigsered by: A C-Score of $0 / 6$ implies improving financials and unlikely manipulating profit.

An F-Score of 6/9 suggests financials are improving.
An Altman Z-Score of 8.04 is in the Safe Zone: Financially sound.

## Possible earnings manipulation through acquisition accounting in FY16 owing to material acquisitions, goodwill and rising deferred tax assets.

No evidence of window dressing
Scores $0 / 4$ in Y/FY17. $64 \%$ of companies score similarly and just $2.4 \%$ of frauds. Rest easy. Triggered Fake Cash Flow in last 5yrs?: FY14 FY13
Net flows over 5yrs at 2\% of Sales are normal.
Material unreconcilable change of debt in 2 of the last 5 years.

## Triggers 20 red flags in the last financial period which is high

Cash \& STI of KRW132.3bn is within normal range.
Restricted Cash of KRWObn is within normal range.
Receivables of KRW376bn are equal to $15 \%$ of Sales which is in within normal range
Delinquency at $0 \%$ of total receivables are within normal range.
Large Payables of KRW349.2bn equal to $18 \%$ of Sales are in the $86 \%$ ile relative to peers, can be a sign of hidden debt.
Inventories of KRW578.4bn are equal to $23 \%$ of Sales which is within normal range.
No evidence of profit/cash flow manipulation through working capital.
Prepaid Expenses of KRW25.1bn, equal to $1 \%$ of Sales, raise the risk of illegal cash extraction.
Capitalised expenses relative to pre-tax profits ( $1.3 \%$ ) are within normal range.
Investments in Associates of KRW26.6bn are equal to $2 \%$ of equity and $6 \%$ of OP, within normal range.
Auditing expenses of 1.4 bp of sales are unusually low in the $9 \%$ ile relative to peers, suggesting a poor audit.
Targe Deferred Tax Assets/Sales of $4 \%$ in the $86 \%$ ile relative to peers, might refect losses at subsidiaries or of Acquisition Accounting
Deferred Tax Liabilities/Sales of $12 \%$ are within normal range.
Derivatives equal to $0 \%$ of equity within normal range.
Large Other LT Liabilities of KRW212.4bn include Pension Liabilities of KRW163.4bn
Within normal range.
EBIT Interest Cover of 4.1 x is within normal range.
Total Debt/Profit of 17.6 x is too high.
No evidence of related party transactions. Evidence of share price manipulation as 20 day MA Bid/Ask VWAP in excess of $60 \%$ for $4 \%$ of the
which is unusually high. Other comprehensive income is $-209 \%$ of income which is unusually high.

## GMT Research Accounting Screen



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| Ratios | Global/Sector/ | Fila Korea Ltd Ratios |  |  | Ratio Change |  | Peer Group Comparison Ratios |  |  |  | Percentiles and Red Flags |  |  | Red Flag Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Country | Y/FY17 | Y/FY16 | Y/FY14 | 1yr Chg | -3yr Chg | 20th \%ile | 50th \%ile | 80th \%ile | No of Peers | Y/FY17 | -1yr Chg | -3yr Chg |  |
| Cash Flow |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0-100\%) | (+/-50\%) | (+/-50\%) |  |
| CFO/Net Profit (x) | GICS Industry | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.7 | +0.5 | -0.2 | 0.3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1,697 | 77\% | -17\% | +14\% |  |
| Cash Interest Exp./CFO (\%) | GICS Industry | 146.0 | -377.5 | 29.9 | +523.5 | +116.0 | 0.2 | 4.8 | 25.8 | 271 | 96\% | +48\% | +43\% | Cash Interest Exp./CFO (\%) high. Fallen over 1yr. Fallen over 3yrs. |
| Capex/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 1.6 | 2.4 | 0.8 | -0.9 | +0.7 | 1.4 | 3.2 | 7.2 | 371 | 23\% | -22\% | +16\% |  |
| Decrease Investments/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | +0.2 | +0.2 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 4.8 | 141 | 33\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Other Investing Activitie/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 0.6 | 25.4 | 5.1 | -24.8 | -4.4 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 4.4 | 292 | 38\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Debt Repay/ST Debt -1FY (\%) | Global | 128 | 123 | 119 | +4.9 | +8.9 | 20.0 | 88.4 | 210.9 | 10,373 | 68\% | +8\% | +8\% |  |
| Free Cash Flow Margin (\%) | GICS Industry | -0.4 | -2.8 | 4.1 | +2.4 | -4.4 | -4.2 | 2.4 | 8.7 | 377 | 66\% | -12\% | +26\% |  |
| FCF-Divs/Sales (\%) | Global | -0.5 | -3.1 | 3.8 | +2.6 | -4.3 | -7.2 | 0.9 | 6.8 | 10,563 | 59\% | -15\% | +25\% | FCF-Divs/Sales (\%) low. |
| No. of Mat. Capital Inc-5yrs | Global | 3 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 9,451 | 98\% | 3 | $\bigcirc$ | No. of Mat. Capital Inc-5yrs high. |
| Other Fin. Activities/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 2.6 | 0.2 | 0.4 | +2.4 | +2.2 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 329 | 86\% | $\geq$ | $\bigcirc$ | Other Fin. Activities/Sales (\%) high. |
| Corporate Governance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0-100\%) | (+/-50\%) | (+/-50\%) |  |
| Auditing Exp//sales (bp) | GICS Industry | 1.4 | S | - | $\bigcirc$ | - | 2.5 | 6.3 | 13.2 | 179 | 9\% | $\xrightarrow{3}$ | $\xrightarrow{\sim}$ | Auditing Exp/Sales (bp) low. |
| RPT Balances/Eguity (\%) | Global | 0.0 | 3 | $\bigcirc$ | $\rightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ | 0.3 | 1.9 | 11.0 | 1,434 | na | 3 | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Number of Aca\&Disp-5yrs | Global |  | $<$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 0.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 12,251 | 66\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | Number of Acq\&Disp -5yrs high. |
| Acq\&Disp Con./Sales Av. - -yyrs (\%) | Global | 8.2 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\square$ | 0.2 | 1.4 | 6.9 | 12,251 | 82\% | 3 | 3 | Acq\&Disp Con./Sales Av. -5yrs (\%) high. |
| Executive Comp/Sales (bp) | GICS Industry | 5.5 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\rightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ | 7.4 | 22.6 | 73.1 | 84 | 14\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Executive Comp/PTP (bp) | GICS Industry | 77.0 | $\rightarrow$ | $\longrightarrow$ | $\rightarrow$ | 3 | 67.6 | 188.6 | 669.0 | 84 | 22\% | 3 | 3 |  |
| CEO Tenure (yrs) | Global | 0.2 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\rightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ | 1.4 | 4.5 | 10.8 | 5,466 | 0\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | CEO Tenure (yrs) low. |
| CFO Tenure (yrs) | Global | na | $\cdots$ | 3 | $\rightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ | 1.1 | 3.3 | 8.3 | 716 | na | $\sum$ | $彐$ |  |
| Av. Executive Tenure (yrs) | Global | 6.3 | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ | $\rightarrow$ | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ | $\rightarrow$ | 4.1 | 7.4 | 11.9 | 3,291 | 41\% | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |  |
| Av. Board Tenure (yrs) | Global | 4.8 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 3.9 | 6.4 | 9.9 | 3,672 | 30\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\xrightarrow{+}$ |  |

Source: GMT Research, Bloomberg

Summary of financials in Y/FY17
Average Ratio Percentile Score ( 0 is good, 100 is bad

- Percentile vs Industry Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 75)
-Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Summary of change in financials over 1 year
Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 62)

- Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Summary of change in financials over 3 yrs Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 62)

- Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Result: Very poor score. High number of red flass. $\qquad$
$\begin{array}{lll}56 \% & \text { In Y/FY17, Fila Korea Ltd recorded an average percentile score ( } 0 \text { is good, } 100 \text { is } \\ 83 \% & \text { bad) of } 56 \% \text { across all } 75 \text { financial ratios listed below. This places it in a percentile }\end{array}$
30 of 83 relative to around 379 GICS industry peers globally, which is a very unusual
result. The company triggered a total of 20 red flags out of 75 placing it in a
percentile of 84 relative to our sample of 16,000 companies globally, which is a very unusual result.
Result: Number of red flags normal.
Over the financial year prior to Y/FY17, Fila Korea Ltd triggered a total of 10 red
$67 \%$ flags out of 62 placing it in a percentile of 67 relative to our sample of 16,000 companies globally, which is a moderate result
Result: High number of red flags. $\qquad$ lags out of 62 placing it in a percentile of 96 relative to our sample of 16,000 companies globally, which is a very unusual result.

## Explanation

Each of the 50 financial ratios listed below is percentile ranked relative to an appropriate peer group drawn from 16,000 companies globally between 2010 and 2015. In general, low percentile scores ar good while high scores are poor. Red flags are mainly triggered when a company's ratio is above the Red flags are highligever, for certain

## Explanation

Red flags are normally triggered by a score between +30 and +50 which suggests an aggressively deteriorating financial ratio. These are highlighted in red below.

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Appendices
Appendix 1: Beneish M-Score


Appendix 4: Altman Z-Score

|  | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Altman Z -Score for a company in emerging markets | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Solvency | 5.08 | 0.48 | 1.60 | 0.18 | 1.84 | 1.84 | Working Capital (Current Assets less Current Liabilities)/Tangible Assets | Ability to meet short term obligations |
| Cumulative profitability | 2.04 | 2.13 | 1.66 | 1.23 | 1.35 | 1.35 | Retained Earnings/Tangible Assets | Determines cumulative historic profitability |
| Profitability | 1.11 | 0.96 | 0.93 | 0.05 | 0.89 | 0.89 | EBIT/Tangible Assets | Measures earnings away from the effects of taxes and leverage |
| Market confidence | na | na | na | na | na | na | Market Capitalisation/Total Liabilities | Whether a firm's value able to cover liabilities |
| Efficiency | na | na | na | na | na | na | Sales/Tangible Assets | An asset turnover metric to measure efficiency |
| Leverage | 1.08 | 1.24 | 1.01 | 0.66 | 0.70 | 0.70 | Book Value of Equity/Total Liabilities | Leverage |
| Altman Z -Score for Y/FY17 | 12.55 | 8.06 | 8.45 | 5.36 | 8.04 | 8.04 | Anything <1.81 for a manufacturer or <1.11 for other companies is problematic | Safe Zone: Financially sound |


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Point Calculation | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Point Calculation | Comments |  |
| Material acquisition? | 1 point | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | An acquisition in excess of $5 \%$ of sales. | No recent material acquisitions (>5\% sales) |  |
| Rise in intangible assets -1yr? | 1 point | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Either a rise in Intangible Assets over 1 year | na |  |
| Material intangibles on balance sheet? | 1 point | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Or Intangibles are $>=50 \%$ ile relative to peers | Intangible Assets/Sales of 57\% are in the 97\%ile |  |
| Rise in deferred tax assets -1yr? | 1 point | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Either a rise in Deferred Tax Asset over 1 year | na |  |
| Large deferred tax assets |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Or a large Deferred Tax Asset in the 80\%ile relative to industry peers | DTA/Sales of 3.5\% is in the 86\%ile relative to industry peers |  |
| Acquisition Accounting |  | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | A score of 3 suggests possibility of acquisition accounting to inflate profits | Possible earnings manipulation through acquisition accounting |  |

## GMT Research Accounting Screen

|  |  | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Point Calculation | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Has high debt repayment/ST debt? Has high effective interest rate? Has moderate debt? Window Dressing |  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Debt Repayment relative to the ST Debt one year prior is in excess of $130 \%$ Effective Interest Rate is in excess of the $80 \%$ ile relative to country peers If Debt to Sales $>15 \%$ ile of industry peers <br> A score of 3 suggests strong likeihood of window dressing | Debt Repayment/ST Debt -1 FY of $128 \%$ is in the $68 \%$ ile relative to global peers Effective Int Rate of $4.6 \%$ is in the $79 \%$ ile relative to country peers Debt/Sales of $45 \%$ is in the $80 \%$ ile relative to industry peers Unlikely to be debt window dressing |
|  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  |  | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 |  |  |
| Appendix 6a: Investment Window Dressing |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | FY13 | Fr14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Point Calculation | Comments |
| High level of investment repayment/sales? |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | If Invest Repay/Sales in excess of the 80\%ile relative to industry peers | Inv. Repayment/Sales of 0\% is in the 33\%ile relative to industry peers |
| High inv. repay./investments -1FY? |  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | If Invest Repay in excess of $100 \%$ of previous year's Investments | Investment Repayment/Investment-1FY of 1000\% |
| Window Dressing Investments |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A score of 2 suggests a strong possibility of window dressing | Unlikely to be window dressing investments |
| Appendix 7: Fake Cash Flow |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Get global screen |
|  |  | fr13 | Fr14 | Fr15 | Fr16 | Fr17 | Y/FY17 | Point Calculation |  |
| High operating margin High return on production assets High level of non-production assets Build-up of non-production assets Low dividends and buybacks A relatively unknown auditor | Critical criterea: 1 point | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Operating Margin $>80 \%$ ile relative in industry peers Op Profit/(PPE + Inv) in the $>80 \%$ ile relative to industry peers (Total Assets-Production Assets)/(COGS or Sales) $>80 \%$ ile versus peers Increase in Non Prod Assets rel to Sales or COGS $>80 \%$ ile peers Dividends and Buybacks are less than $30 \%$ profit | A 12m Trailing Operating Margin of $9 \%$ is in the $56 \%$ ile A 12 m Return on Production Assets of $24 \%$ is in the $68 \%$ ile Non Production Assets/COGS (or Sales) of $165 \%$ is in the $86 \%$ ile Non Production Assets/COGS (or Sales) changed by $-262 \%$ over 1 year Dividends and buybacks of 4\% |
|  |  | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |
|  | 1 point | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  | 1 point | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  | 1pt if $>1$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Relatively obscure auditor | Well known auditor: Samil Pricew Country of incorporation (South Korea) is same as domicile (South Korea). Short term debt is $25 \%$ of total debt |
| Incorporation and Domicile Debt structure |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Different country of incorporation vrs domicile |  |
|  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | If Short Term Debt >75\% Total Debt, or no debt at all |  |
| Sector |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Operates in sector prone to fraud | Textiles, Apparel \& Luxury Goods industry is prone to fraud. |
| Fake Cash Flow Fraud | Max 4pts | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A score of 3 or 4 is problematic and requires further investigation | 64\% of companies score similarly and just $2.4 \%$ of frauds |

Appendix 8: Excess Capital Raising


Normal amounts of cash flow generated.
Appendix 9: Debt Reconciliation Get global screen


\section*{Appendix 10: Ownership Type (latest Bloomberg data) <br> |  | (\%) | Active Versus Passive |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Investment Advisor | 62 | Free Float (\%) | 72 |  |
| Other | 23 | No. Instit. Onners | 88 |  |
| Government | 9 | Institutional (\%) | 66 |  |
| Sovereign Wealth Fund | 3 | - Passive Instit. (ETFs) | (\%) | 21 |
| Holding Company | 2 | - Active Instit. (\%) | 45 |  |
| Other | 0 |  |  |  |}

Appendix 11: Insiders (latest Bloomberg data)

|  |  | Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Insider Shares 0/5 (\%) | 0.00 |  |
| Chg Insider Hldgs -6m (\%) | -59.29 | Changes in insider holdings can be due to options, etc. as opposed to actively buying or selling |
| Number of Insider Shares Purchased ( $m$ ) | +0.0 | shares |
| Number of Insider Shares Sold (m) | -0.0 |  |
| Average Purchase Price of Insider Shares | 0.00 | Current share price is KRW123000 |
| Average Sell Price of Insider Shares | 102099.69 |  |
| Shares Outstanding ( m ) | $12$ |  |
|  |  |  |

Appendix 12: Comprehensive Income (latest Bloomberg data)

|  | (KRWm) | Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Comprehensive Income | $(68,086)$ |  |
| Less: |  |  |
| Net Income/Net Profit (Losses) | 62,388 |  |
| Other comprehensive income comprised of: |  |  |
| Foreign Currency Trans. Adj. | $(123,965)$ | Other comprehensive income is $-209 \%$ of income which is unusually high. Unable to reconcile |
| Pension Related Adjustments | $(46,331)$ | $87 \%$ of other comprehensive income which is unusually high. |
| Change In Fair Value of Derivatives | $(14,643)$ |  |
| Unrealized Gain (Loss) On Securities | 424 |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| Amount unable to reconcile: | 54,042 |  |

