## GMT Research Accounting Screen

GICS Ind Name
GICS Industry
Cntry of Dom
Most Recent Balance Sheet Period

Pou Sheng Intl
Specialty Reta

2017 Y
3813 HK
Y 2017
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Country of incorporation (Bermuda) is different from domicile (Hong Kong).
Currency of financials (Yuan Renminbi) is different from the country of risk (Hong Kong).

Description:
Pou Sheng International (Holdings) Limited retails and wholesales sportswear, including sports footwear, apparel and accessories.

Relevant GMT Research Reports (please go to our website and login):
MANIPULATING PROFIT: Pou Sheng: Risks Lie to theDownside (12 Jan 2017)
MANIPULATING PROFIT: Pou Sheng ( 3813 HK): Risks lie to the downside (12 Jan 17)

Short-Seller's Report (for Asian companies only)

Summary of accounting risk for Y/FY17

| Summary of accounting risk for Y/FY17 |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| - Profit manipulation | No info |
| - Financial position | No info |
| - General accounting | Normal |
| - Shenanigans | No evidence |
| - Accounting risk: | Medium |

Profit Manipulation
Profit Manipulation: Beneish M-Score (See App 1)
Cooking the Books: Montier's C-Score (App 2)
Financial Position
Strength of Financial Position: Piotroski F-Score (App 3)
Risk of Default: Altman Z-Score (App 4)
Accounting Shenanigans

Acquisition Accounting (App 5 )
Window Dressing (App 6)
Fake Cash Fraud: Overly profitable (App 7) Excess Capital Raising (App 8)
Debt Reconciliation (App 9)
Other Financial Items
Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 75)
Cash Balance
Restricted Cash
Receivables
Doubtful Debts
Payables
nventory
Profit Manipulation: Gross Working Capital
Cash Extraction Fraud: Prepaid Expenses
Capitalisation of Expenses
Affiliate Investments
Auditing Costs
Deferred Tax Assets
Deferred Tax Liabilities
Derivatives
Other Large Curious Assets and/or Liabilities
Depn \& Amort
Interest Cove
Leverage
Related Party Fraud
Other Tests:

Lastest financials for 31/12/2017 incomplete Unable to calculate Beneish M-Score owing to insufficient disclosure Unable to calculate Montier's C-Score owing to insufficient disclosure.

Unable to calculate Piotroski's F-Score owing to insufficient disclosure.
Unable to calculate Altman Z-Score owing to insufficient disclosure.

## No evidence of acquisition accounting.

No evidence of window dressing
Sores 0/4 in Y/FY17. 64\% of companies score similarly and just $2.4 \%$ of frauds. Rest easy. Triggered Fake Cash Flow in last 5yrs?: None Net flows over 5yrs at $-1 \%$ of Sales are normal.
No material unreconcilable changes in debt in the last 5 years.
Triggers 11 red flags in the last financial period which is normal
Cash \& STI of CNYO.5bn is within normal range.
Restricted Cash of CNYObn is within normal range
Large Receivables of CNY1.6bn are equal to $8 \%$ of Sales which is in the $80 \%$ ile relative to peers, can be a sign of channel stuffing
Delinquency at $0 \%$ of total receivables are within normal range
arge Payables of CNY1.6bn are within normal range
Large Inventories of CNY5.6bn are equal to $30 \%$ of Sales which is in the $88 \%$ ile relative to peers, have grown by 3ppts relative to Sales over the past year which can be a sign of channel stuffing.
No evidence of profit/cash flow manipulation through working capital.
No evidence of illegal cash extraction fraud.
Capitalised expenses relative to pre-tax profits ( $0 \%$ ) are within normal range.
Investments in Associates of CNYObn are equal to $1 \%$ of equity and $0 \%$ of OP, within normal range.
Auditing expenses of 2 bp of sales are unusually low in the $18 \%$ ile relative to peers, suggesting a poor audit.
Deferred Tax Assets/Sales of $0 \%$ are within normal range
Deferred Tax Liabilities/Sales of $3 \%$ are within normal range.
Derivatives equal to $0 \%$ of equity within normal range
Within normal range
Within normal range
EBIT Interest Cover of 7.2 x is within normal range
Total Debt/Profit of $6.7 x$ and assets to equity of $1.8 x$ are within normal range
No evidence of related party transactions.
Evidence of substantial losses at consolidated subsidiaries owing to high effective tax rate and rising deferred tax assets. Evidence of share price manipulation as 20 day MA Bid/Ask VWAP in excess of $60 \%$ for $24 \%$ of the time over last 6 m . No or new CFO.

## GMT Research Accounting Screen



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| Ratios | Global/Sector/ | Pou Sheng Int\| Ratios |  |  | Ratio Change |  | Peer Group Comparison Ratios |  |  | Percentiles and Red Flags |  |  |  | Red Flag Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Country | Y/FY17 | Y/FY16 | Y/FY14 | -1yr Chg | -3yr Chg | 20th \%ile | 50th \%ile | 80th \%ile | No of Peers | Y/FY17 | -1yr Chg | -3yr Chg |  |
| Cash Flow |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0-100\%) | (+/-50\%) | (+/-50\%) |  |
| CFO/Net Profit (x) | GICS Industry | na | -0.1 | 18.6 | na | na | 0.6 | 1.3 | 2.5 | 1,802 | na | na | na |  |
| Cash Interest Exp./CFO (\%) | GICS Industry | na | -100.7 | 11.5 | na | na | 0.2 | 4.1 | 21.4 | 330 | na | na | na |  |
| Capex/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | na | 2.8 | 1.3 | na | na | 1.1 | 2.4 | 4.6 | 415 | na | na | na |  |
| Decrease Investments/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | +0.0 | -0.6 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.5 | 120 | na | $\longrightarrow$ | $\square$ |  |
| Other Investing Activities/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.4 | 344 | na | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Debt Repay/ST Debt-1FY (\%) | Global | 0 | 481 | 179 | -481.4 | -178.6 | 20.0 | 88.4 | 210.9 | 10,373 | na | na | na |  |
| Free Cash Flow Margin (\%) | GICS Industry | na | -3.2 | 3.0 | na | na | -1.8 | 1.8 | 6.2 | 411 | na | na | na |  |
| FCF-Div//Sales (\%) | Global | na | -3.8 | na | na | na | -7.2 | 0.9 | 6.8 | 10,563 | na | na | na |  |
| No. of Mat. Capital Inc -5yrs | Global |  | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\rightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 9,451 | 85\% | $\longrightarrow$ | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ |  |
| Other Fin. Activities/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | na | 0.6 | 0.3 | na | na | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 327 | na | $\sum$ | $\sum$ |  |
| Corporate Governance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0-100\%) | (+/-50\%) | (+/-50\%) |  |
| Auditing Exp/Sales (bp) | GICS Industry | 2.0 | ${ }_{3}$ | $\square$ | $\xrightarrow{3}$ | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ | 2.1 | 5.2 | 10.0 | 204 | 18\% | $\xrightarrow{3}$ | $\stackrel{\square}{\square}$ | Auditing Exp/Sales (bp) low. |
| RPT Balances/Equity (\%) | Global | 0.0 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 0.3 | 1.9 | 11.0 | 1,434 | na | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Number of Acq\& Disp-5yrs | Global | 2 | $\bigcirc$ | 3 | $\sum$ | $\longrightarrow$ | 0.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 12,251 | 46\% | $\rightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Acq\&Disp Con./Sales Av. -5yrs (\%) | Global | 0.2 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\checkmark$ | $\longrightarrow$ | 0.2 | 1.4 | 6.9 | 12,251 | 15\% | 3 | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Executive Comp/Sales (bp) | GICS Industry | na | $\sum$ | $\sum$ | $\square$ | $\sum$ | 9.5 | 28.5 | 68.8 | 133 | na | $\square$ | $\stackrel{3}{3}$ |  |
| Executive Comp/PTP (bp) | GICS Industry | na | $\cdots$ | $\checkmark$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 131.1 | 423.7 | 1,177.7 | 133 | na | $\checkmark$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| CEO Tenure (yrs) | Global | 1.3 | $\bigcirc$ | $\longrightarrow$ |  | $\rightarrow$ | 1.4 | 4.5 | 10.8 | 5,466 | 17\% | 3 | $\bigcirc$ | CEO Tenure (yrs) low. |
| CFO Tenure (yrs) | Global | na | $\checkmark$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 1.1 | 3.3 | 8.3 | 716 | na | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Av. Executive Tenure (yrs) | Global | na | $\cdots$ | $\sum$ | $\longrightarrow$ | $\longrightarrow$ | 4.1 | 7.4 | 11.9 | 3,291 | na | $\square$ | $\square$ |  |
| Av. Board Tenure (yrs) | Global | 5.9 | $\sim$ | $\bigcirc$ | < | $\bigcirc$ | 3.9 | 6.4 | 9.9 | 3,672 |  | $3 \times$ | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ |  |

Source: GMT Research, Bloomberg

Summary of financials in Y/FY17
Average Ratio Percentile Score ( 0 is good, 100 is bad

- Percentile vs Industry Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 75)
-Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Summary of change in financials over 1 year Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 62)

- Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Summary of change in financials over 3 yrs Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 62)

- Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Result: Scores within normal range. Number of red flags normal. $\qquad$
47\% In Y/FY17, Pou Sheng Intl recorded an average percentile score ( 0 is good, 100 is
$40 \%$ bad) of $47 \%$ across all 75 financial ratios listed below. This places it in a percentile
11 of 40 relative to around 413 GICS industry peers globally, which is a modera
43\% result. The company triggered a total of 11 red flags out of 75 placing it in a percentile of 43 relative to our sample of 16,000 companies globally, which is a moderate result.
Result: Number of red flags normal Over the financial year prior to $\mathrm{Y} /$ FY17, Pou Sheng Intl triggered a total of 6 red
$36 \%$ flags out of 62 placing it in a percentile of 36 relative to our sample of 16,000 companies globally, which is a moderate result. Result: Number of red flags normal.
Over the 3 financial years prior to $\mathrm{Y} / \mathrm{FY} 17$, Pou Sheng Intl triggered a total of 5 red flags out of 62 placing it in a percentile of 33 relative to our sample of 16,000 companies globally, which is a moderate result.

## Explanation

Each of the 50 financial ratios listed below is percentile ranked relative to an appropriate peer group drawn from 16,000 companies globally between 2010 and 2015. In general, low percentile scores are good while high scores are poor. Red flags are mainly triggered when a company's ratio is above the Red flags are highlighted below in red.
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## Explanation

Red flags are normally triggered by a score between +30 and +50 which suggests an aggressively deteriorating financial ratio. These are highlighted in red below.

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## GMT Research Accounting Screen

Appendices
Appendix 1: Beneish M-Score

|  | Calculation | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Index Calculation |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Days Sales in Receivables Index | +(0.92*1.03) | 0.97 | 0.82 | 0.89 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 1.03 |  |
| Gross Margin Index | +(0.528*1.01) | 1.03 | 0.99 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 1.01 | 1.01 |  |
| Asset Quality Index | +(0.404*0.86) | 0.90 | 1.02 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 0.86 | 0.86 |  |
| Sales Growth Index | +(0.892*1.16) | 0.99 | 1.12 | 1.18 | 1.12 | 1.16 | 1.16 | Sales $/$ / sles $_{\text {t-1 }}$ |
| Depreciation Index | $+(0.115 * 0.72)$ | 0.84 | 1.24 | 1.05 | 1.05 | 0.72 | 0.72 |  |
| SG\&A Index | -(0.172*1.02) | 1.03 | 1.03 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 2 | 1.0 |  |
| Total Accruals to Total Assets | na | -0.02 | -0.06 | -0.05 | 0.07 | na | na | Profit from Continuing Ops $\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{t}}$ - ash Flows from Opst $/$ / Total Asse |
| Leverage Index | -(0.327*0.87) | 1.18 | 1.15 | 1.00 | 0.82 | 0.87 | 0.87 |  |
| Beneish M-Score for Y/FY17 | -4.84 = | -2.74 | -2.84 | -2.77 | -2.09 | na | na | An M-Score of $>-2.22$ signals that the company is likely to be a manipulator |

Receiventses on latest perios 28 days have increased by 1 days Yoy
12 m Trailing Gross Margin of $35 \%$ has deteriorated by 0.5 ppts YoY Other LT Assets/Total Assets of $12 \%$ has fallen by 1.9 ppts YoY 12 m Trailing Sales have risen $16 \%$ Yoy
12 m Trailing Depreciation/Sales of $27.1 \%$ has risen by 7.5 ppts $Y$ oy 12 m Trailing SG\&A/Sales of $30.9 \%$ have fallen by $0.6 \mathrm{ppts} Y$ Yo

LTebt + Current Liabilities/Total Assets of $43 \%$ have risen by 5.4 ppts Yoy
Unable to calculate Beneish M-Score owing to insufficient disclosure

| Appendix 2: Montier C-Score |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Fr13 | FY14 | Fr15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/Fr17 | Point Calculation | Comments |
| Profit | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | na | na | A growing divergence between Profit and Operating Cash Flow (1 point) | na |
| Receivables | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Receivable Days are increasing (1 point) | Receivables of 28 days have increased by 1 days Yoy |
| Inventory | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Inventory Days are increasing (1 point) | Inventory of 30 days has risen by 3 days Yoy |
| Other current assets | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Other Current Assets to Sales are increasing (1 point) | Other Current Assets/Sales of $7.1 \%$ have fallen by 0.1ppts Yoy |
| Depreciaton | na | na | 0 | 0 | na | na | Depreciation relative to PPE jobs usfa bs | na |
| Asset growth | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | High asset growth in excess of 10\% (1 point) | Asset growth of $14 \%$ YoY is in excess of 10\% |
| Montier's C-Score | 2 | 0 | 1 | 5 | na | na | Score 0-1 is good; 2-4 is average, 5-6 is bad | Unable to calculate Montier's C-Score owing to insufficient disclosure |

Appendix 3: Piotroski F-Score
Sher in excess of $10 \%$ ( 1 point)

Net Income Score
Operating Cash Flow Score
Return on Assets Score
Long-Term Debt to Assets Score
Current Ratio Score
Shares Outstanding Score
Gross Margin Score
Asset Turnover Scor
2

| FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Poi |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Po |  |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | na | na | Pos |  |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Hig |  |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | na | na | Op |  |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Low |  |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Hig |  |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No |  |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Ah |  |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Ah |  |
| 0 | 1 | 9 | 5 | na | na | Sco |  |
| 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Positive Return on Assets in the current year (1 point) Positive Operating Cash Flow in the current year (1 point) Operating Cash Flow are greater than ROA (1 point) Lower ratio of Long Term Debt than previous year (1 point) Higher Current Ratio this year compared to the previous year (1 point) new shares were issued in the last year ( 1 point)
A higher Gross Margin compared to the previous year (1 point)
A high Asset Turnover ratio compared to the A high Asset Turnover ratio compared to the previous year (1 point)

Appendix 4: Altman Z-Score

|  | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Altman Z -Score for a non-manufacturing company | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Solvency | 3.48 | 3.60 | 3.26 | 2.85 | 2.54 | 2.54 | Working Capital (Current Assets less Current Liabilities)/Tangible Assets | Ability to meet short term obligations |
| Cumulative profitability | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.35 | 0.48 | na | na | Retained Earnings/Tangible Assets | Determines cumulative historic profitability |
| Profitability | 0.07 | 0.23 | 0.56 | 0.70 | 0.50 | 0.50 | EBIT/Tangible Assets | Measures earnings away from the effects of taxes and leverage |
| Market confidence | na | na | na | na | na | na | Market Capitalisation/Total Liabilities | Whether a firm's value able to cover liabilities |
| Efficiency | na | na | na | na | na | na | Sales/Tangible Assets | An asset turnover metric to measure efficiency |
| Leverage | 1.67 | 2.03 | 2.16 | 1.65 | 1.35 | 1.35 | Book Value of Equity/Total Liabilities | Leverage |
| Altman Z -Score for Y/FY17 | 5.41 | 6.03 | 6.34 | 5.67 | na | na | Anything <1.81 for a manufacturer or <1.11 for other companies is problematic | Unable to calculate Altman Z-Score owing to insufficient disclosure |

Appendix 5: Acquisition Accounting

| Point Calculation | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 point | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| 1 point | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
|  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| 1 point | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
|  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | na | na | na |
|  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |


| Point Calculation | Comments |
| :---: | :---: |
| An acquisition in excess of 5\% of sales. | No recent acquisitions |
| Either a rise in Intangible Assets over 1 year | na |
| Or Intangibles are >=50\%ile relative to peers | Intangible Assets/Sales of 5\% are in the $72 \%$ |
| Either a rise in Deferred Tax Asset over 1 year | na |
| Or a large Deferred Tax Asset in the 80\%ile relative to industry peers | na |
| A score of 3 suggests possibility of acquisition accounting to inflate profits | No evidence of acquisition accounting |

## GMT Research Accounting Screen


= Net internal cash generation
Externally generated cash flows
Debt issuance, net
Equity issuance

$=$ Net external financing | Net surplus/(deficit) |
| :--- |
| Net flows/Sales (\%) |

Net flows/Sales (\%)
Relative to Global Sector (\%ile)
Relative to Global Sector $(\%)$
Av. cash balance/sales (\%)
Relative to Global Sector (\%ile)
Core cash required ( $6 \%$ of Sales)
Surplus cash at year end (cash balance less core cash):
Possible fake cash/excess cash balance (\%) $\qquad$

| (4) |
| :--- |
| 517) |

Normal amounts of cash flow generated.
Appendix 9: Debt Reconciliation (based on latest annual data)

| Appendix 9: Debt Reconciliation (based on |  |  |  |  |  | bbal sc |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (CNYm) | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | FY13-17 |
| Balance sheet (BS) debt YE 2,268 | 1,620 | 1,220 | 456 | 1,376 | 2,656 |  |
| Change in debt: BS | (648) | (400) | (764) | +920 | +1,280 | +389 |
| Change in debt: Cash flow (CF) | (517) | (316) | (870) | 1,005 | \#N/AN/A | (698) |
| Unrec chg BS and CF debt | (131) | (83) | +105 | (85) | na | +1,086 |
| Unrec chg/total debt (\%) | (8) | (7) | +23 | (6) | +0 | 41 |
| Possible reason: | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok |  |
| No material unreconcilable changes in debt in the last 5 years. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reasons: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Assets paid with debt (such as operating leases) is a non-cash item. Capex should be restated. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Proceeds raised from convertible bonds (CBs) are sometimes regarded as equity, not debt. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Large acquisitions can lead to difficulties in reconciling debt. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - If no reason is found, further work is needed. |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Appendix 11: Insiders (latest Bloomberg data)

| Insider Shares $\mathrm{O} / \mathrm{S}(\%)$ | 0.47 | Comment |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Chg Insider HIlds $-6 \mathrm{~m}(\%)$ | 1.22 | Changes in insider holdings can be due to options, etc. as opposed to actively buying or selling |
| Number of Insider Shares Purchased $(\mathrm{m})$ | +0.0 | shares |
| Number of Insider Shares Sold $(\mathrm{m})$ | +0.0 |  |
| Average Purchase Price of Insider Shares | 0.00 | Current share price is HKD2 |
| Average Sell Price of Insider Shares | 0.00 |  |
| Shares Outstanding m ) | 5,341 |  |
| Insider Shares Traded $-6 \mathrm{~m} /$ Total Shares $(\%)$ | 0.00 |  |

Appendix 12: Comprehensive Income (latest Bloomberg data)

|  | (CNYm) | Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Comprehensive Income | 399 |  |
| Less: |  |  |
| Net Income/Net Profit (Losses) | 394 |  |
| Other comprehensive income comprised of: |  |  |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 6 | Other comprehensive income is $1 \%$ of income which is within normal range. Able to fully |
| Foreign Currency Trans. Adj. | (1) | reconcile other comprehensive income. |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| Amount unable to reconcile: | (0) |  |

