## GMT Research Accounting Screen

Short Name
GICS Ind Name
GICS Industry
Cntry of Dom
Most Recent Balance Sheet Period
Ticker
Latest Period
Current Fiscal Year
Current Fiscal Year
Well known auditor:
Numbe of auditors in past 5yrs:
Country of incorporation:
Country of financials:

Under Armour-A
extiles, Apparel \& Luxury Goods
252,030

| 252,03 |
| :--- | :--- |
| US |
| 2017 Y |

2017 Y
UAA US

| Y |
| :--- |
| 2017 |

2017
1
Country of incorporation (United States) is same as domicile (United States). Currency of financials (US Dollar) is same as country of risk (United States).

## Description:

Under Armour, Inc. develops, markets, and distributes branded performance products for men, women, and youth. The Company designs and sells a broad offering of apparel and accessories made of synthetic microfibers

| Relevant GMT Research Reports (please go to our website and login): |  |
| :--- | :--- |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| Short-Seller's Report (for Asian companies only) |  |
|  |  |
| Summary of accounting risk for Y/FY17 |  |
| - Profit manipulation | High risk: Montier. |
| - Financial position | Normal |
| - General accounting | No evidence |
| - Shenanigans | High |
| - Accounting risk: |  |

Latest financials complete
= Accounting risk:
This spreadsheet expires on 30th June 2018, in 70 days. Beneish M-Score of -2.51 in Y/FY17 suggests no profit manipulation
A C-Score of $4 / 6$ is slightly worse than average; watch out for: Rising receivables. Rising inventory. Rising OCA. Falling depreciation.
An F-Score of 3/9 suggests financials are deteriorating owing to: ROA. Leverage. Current Ratio. Increase in Shares. Gross Margin. Asset Turnover.
An Altman Z-Score of 4.35 is in the Safe Zone: Financially sound.
Possible earnings manipulation through acquisition accounting in FY15 FY13 owing to material acquisitions, goodwill and rising deferred tax assets.
No evidence of window dressing
Scores $0 / 4$ in Y/FY17. 64\% of companies score similarly and just $2.4 \%$ of frauds. Rest easy. Triggered Fake Cash Flow in last 5yrs?: FY15 FY14
Net flows over 5yrs at 0\% of Sales are normal
No material unreconcilable changes in debt in the last 5 years.
Triggers 17 red flags in the last financial period which is normal.
Cash \& STI of USDO.3bn is within normal range.
Restricted Cash of USDObn is within normal range.
Receivables of USDO.6bn are equal to $12 \%$ of Sales which is in within normal range.
Delinquency at $0 \%$ of total receivables are within normal range.
Payables of USDO.9bn have been extended by 4ppts relative to Sales over the past year which can be a sign of manufactured cash flow.
Inventories of USD1.2bn have been extended by 4ppts relative to Sales over the past year which can be a sign of channel stuffing.
An increase in working capital at $10 \%$ of sales owing to higher Inventories and Payables suggests inflated cash flows and/or profit over the past year.
Prepaid Expenses of USDO.3bn are large relative to sales (5.2\%) and inventory ( $22.2 \%$ ), raising the risk of illegal cash extraction fraud.
na
There are no investments in associates.
No information available
Large Deferred Tax Assets/Sales of $4 \%$ in the $90 \%$ ile relative to peers, might refect losses at subsidiaries or of Acquisition Accounting
Deferred Tax Liabilities/Sales of $4 \%$ are within normal range.
Derivatives equal to $0 \%$ of equity within normal range.
Within normal range
Within normal range
EBIT Interest Cover of $0.8 x$ is low.
Total Debt/Profit of $10.3 x$ and assets to equity of $2 x$ are within normal range
No evidence of related party transactions.
New CFO. Unable to reconcile $-29 \%$ of other comprehensive income which is unusually high. Other comprehensive income is $-29 \%$ of income which is unusually high. Gross Margin volatility is unusually ow at $2.3 \%$ in the $13 \%$ ile relative to peers which is sometimes a trait of frauds.

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# GMT Research Accounting Screen 

| Ratios | Global/Sector/ | Under Armour-A Ratios |  |  | Ratio Change |  | Peer Group Comparison Ratios |  |  | Percentiles and Red Flags |  |  |  | Red Flag Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Country | Y/FY17 | Y/FY16 | Y/FY14 | -1yr Chg | -3yr Chg | 20th \%ile | 50th \%ile | 80th \%ile | No of Peers | Y/FY17 | -1yr Chg | -3yr Chg |  |
| Cash Flow |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0-100\%) | (+/-50\%) | (+/-50\%) |  |
| CFO/Net Profit ( X ) | GICS Industry | Loss | 1.4 | 1.1 | na | na | 0.3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1,697 | na | na | na |  |
| Cash Interest Exp./CFO (\%) | GICS Industry | 12.7 | 5.9 | 1.9 | +6.8 | +10.8 | 0.2 | 4.8 | 25.8 | 271 | 66\% | +26\% | +27\% |  |
| Capex/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 5.7 | 8.0 | 4.6 | -2.3 | +1.1 | 1.4 | 3.2 | 7.2 | 371 | 71\% | -34\% | +23\% |  |
| Decrease Investments/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | -0.6 | +0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 4.8 | 141 | na | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Other Investing Activities/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | -0.1 | -0.4 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 4.4 | 292 | na | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Debt Repay/ST Debt -1FY (\%) | Global | 2,463 | 2,788 | 113 | -324.5 | +2,349.9 | 20.0 | 88.4 | 210.9 | 10,373 | 95\% | -43\% | +46\% | Debt Repay/ST Debt -1FY (\%) high. Risen over 3yrs. |
| Free Cash Flow Margin (\%) | GICS Industry | -1.0 | -0.5 | 2.5 | -0.5 | -3.5 | -4.2 | 2.4 | 8.7 | 377 | 68\% | +8\% | +23\% |  |
| FCF-Divs/Sales (\%) | Global | na | -0.5 | na | na | na | -7.2 | 0.9 | 6.8 | 10,563 | na | na | na |  |
| No. of Mat. Capital Inc-5yrs | Global | 0 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 9,451 | na | - | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ |  |
| Other Fin. Activities/Sales (\%) | GICS Industry | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.2 | -0.3 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 329 | 28\% | 3 | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Corporate Governance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0-100\%) | (+/-50\%) | (+/-50\%) |  |
| Auditing Exp//Sales (bp) | GICS Industry | na | $\bigcirc$ | $\xrightarrow{5}$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ | 2.5 | 6.3 | 13.2 | 179 | na | $\xrightarrow{ }$ | $\xrightarrow{ }$ |  |
| RPT Balances/Equity (\%) | Global | 0.0 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\checkmark$ | $\xrightarrow{3}$ | 0.3 | 1.9 | 11.0 | 1,434 | na | $\bigcirc$ | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ |  |
| Number of Ac9\&Disp-5yrs | Global |  | $\bigcirc$ |  | $\bigcirc$ | $\rightarrow$ | 0.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 12,251 | 55\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Acq\&Disp Con./Sales Av. -5yrs (\%) | Global | 4.1 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  | $\xrightarrow{3}$ | 0.2 | 1.4 | 6.9 | 12,251 | 70\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Executive Comp/Sales (bp) | GICS Industry | 60.9 | $\bigcirc$ | $\longrightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 7.4 | 22.6 | 73.1 | 84 | 76\% | $\checkmark$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Executive Comp/PTP (bp) | GICS Industry | na |  | $\rightarrow$ | , | , | 67.6 | 188.6 | 669.0 | 84 | na | 3 | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| CEO Tenure (yrs) | Global | 22.3 | $\bigcirc$ | $\longrightarrow$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 1.4 | 4.5 | 10.8 | 5,466 | 95\% | - | $\bigcirc$ | CEO Tenure (yrs) high. |
| CFOT Tenure (yrs) | Global | 0.9 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 1.1 | 3.3 | 8.3 | 716 | 15\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | CFO Tenure (yrs) low. |
| Av. Executive Tenure (yrs) | Global | 5.0 | $\cdots$ | $\bigcirc$ |  | $\rightarrow$ | 4.1 | 7.4 | 11.9 | 3,291 | 28\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |  |
| Av. Board Tenure (yrs) | Global | 9.9 | $\bigcirc$ | 2 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | 3.9 | 6.4 | 9.9 | 3,672 | 80\% | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ | Av. Board Tenure (yrs) high. |

Summary of financials in Y/FY17
Average Ratio Percentile Score ( 0 is good, 100 is bad)

- Percentile vs Industry Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 75)

- Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Summary of change in financials over 1 year Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 62)

- Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Summary of change in financials over 3 yrs Number of Red Flags (Out of a possible 62) - Percentile vs Global Peers ( $0 \%$ is good, $100 \%$ is bad)

Result: Very poor score. Number of red flags normal.

## Explanation

$\qquad$
$56 \%$ In Y/FY17, Under Armour-A recorded an average percentile score ( 0 is good, 100 is
$82 \%$ bad) of $56 \%$ across all 75 financial ratios listed below. This places it in a percentile
79\% result. The company triggered a total of 17 red flags out of 75 placing it in a percentile of 79 relative to our sample of 16,000 companies globally, which is a moderate result.

Each of the 50 financial ratios listed below is percentile ranked relative to an appropriate peer group drawn from 16,000 companies globally between 2010 and 2015. In general, low percentile scores ar 80th werenigh heres are poor. Red flags are mainy trggered when a company's ratio is above the 80th percentile; however, for certain r $r$.
Red

Result: High number of red flags. $\qquad$

## Explanation

17 Over the financial year prior to Y/FY17, Under Armour-A triggered a total of 17 red flags out of 62 placing it in percentle of 92 relative to our samp of 16,00 companies globally, which is a very unusual result. Result: High number of red flags. $\qquad$ Over the 3 financial years prior to Y/FY1, Under Armour-A triggered a total 24 Red flags are normally triggered by a score between +30 and +50 which suggests an aggressively companies globally, which is a very unusual result.

## GMT Research Accounting Screen

Appendices
Appendix 1: Beneish M-Score


## Appendix 4: Altman Z-Score

|  | FY13 | FY14 | FY15 | FY16 | FY17 | Y/FY17 | Altman Z -Score for a manufacturing company | Comments |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Solvency | 1.07 | 0.79 | 0.56 | 0.51 | 0.45 | 0.45 | Working Capital (Current Assets less Current Liabilities)/Tangible Assets | Ability to meet short term obligations |
| Cumulative profitability | 0.64 | 0.62 | 0.68 | 0.58 | 0.49 | 0.49 | Retained Earnings/Tangible Assets | Determines cumulative historic profitability |
| Profitability | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.61 | 0.46 | 0.03 | 0.03 | EBIT/Tangible Assets | Measures earnings away from the effects of taxes and leverage |
| Market confidence | 10.57 | 11.70 | 8.73 | 4.74 | 1.93 | 1.93 | Market Capitalisation/Total Liabilities | Whether a firm's value able to cover liabilities |
| Efficiency | 1.63 | 1.59 | 1.80 | 1.60 | 1.46 | 1.46 | Sales/Tangible Assets | An asset turnover metric to measure efficiency |
| Leverage | na | na | na | na | na | na | Book Value of Equity/Total Liabilities | Leverage |
| Altman Z -Score for Y/FY17 | 14.52 | 15.29 | 12.37 | 7.89 | 4.35 | 4.35 | Anything <1.81 for a manufacturer or <1.11 for other companies is problematic | Safe Zone: Financially sound |

Appendix 5: Acquisition Accounti


No recent material acquisitions (>5\% sales)
Nor
na
na
na
Intangible Assets/Sales of $12 \%$ are in the $83 \%$ ile
na
DTA/S
DTA/Sales of $4.4 \%$ is in the $90 \%$ ile relative to industry peers
Acquisition Accounting

## GMT Research Accounting Screen



Appendix 11: Insiders (latest Bloomberg data)

|  |  | Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Insider Shares 0/5 (\%) | 0.87 |  |
| Chg Insider HIdgs -6m (\%) | 0.19 | Changes in insider holdings can be due to options, etc. as opposed to actively buying or sellin |
| Number of Insider Shares Purchased ( m ) | +0.0 | shares |
| Number of Insider Shares Sold (m) | -0.0 |  |
| Average Purchase Price of Insider Shares | 0.00 | Current share price is USD16.1 |
| Average Sell Price of Insider Shares | 16.79 |  |
| Shares Outstanding ( m ) | 442 |  |
|  | 0.00 |  |

Appendix 12: Comprehensive Income (latest Bloomberg data)

|  | (USDm) | Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Comprehensive Income | (34) |  |
| Less: |  |  |
| Net Income/Net Profit (Losses) | (48) |  |
| Other comprehensive income comprised of: |  |  |
| na | na | Other comprehensive income is $-29 \%$ of income which is unusually high. Unable to reconcile - |
| na | na | $29 \%$ of other comprehensive income which is unusually high. |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| na | na |  |
| Amount unable to reconcile: | 14 |  |

- Assets paid with debt (such as operating leases) is a non-cash item. Capex should be restate .

Proceeds raised from convertible bonds (CBs) are sometimes regarded as equity, not debt.
Lare acquistions can lead to difficulties in reconciling debt.

